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LAWLESS LAW ENFORCEMENT: THE JUDICIAL
INVENTION OF ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY FOR
POLICE AND PROSECUTORS IN CALIFORNIA
Frank J. Menetrez*
INTRODUCTION
According to a 1974 opinion of the California Supreme
Court, section 821.6 of the California Government Code,1 a
provision of the California Tort Claims Act, protects "public
employees from liability only for malicious prosecution."2
According to a 2002 opinion of the California Court of Appeal,
however, section 821.6 " 'is not limited to only malicious
prosecution actions.' "' No intervening statutory amendment
or Supreme Court case accounts for the discrepancy.
How did this happen? As a matter of law, the Court of
Appeal cannot overrule a decision of the Supreme Court.4
But as a matter of fact, that is precisely what the Court of
Appeal did. By first ignoring and later purporting to
distinguish Supreme Court authority that was squarely on
point, California's intermediate appellate court effectively
erased the limits that the state's highest court had placed on
the application of section 821.6.
Moreover, having removed those limits, the Court of
Appeal went on to apply section 821.6-an immunity against
suits for malicious prosecution that was intended to protect
* J.D., University of California, Los Angeles, 2000; Ph.D., University of
California, Los Angeles, 1996; B.A., Johns Hopkins University, 1987. I am
grateful to Samuel Rickless for comments on a draft of this article, and to the
staff of the Santa Clara Law Review for their careful editing.
1. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 821.6 (Deering 1982 & Supp. 2008).
2. Sullivan v. County of Los Angeles, 527 P.2d 865, 870 (Cal. 1974).
3. Javor v. Taggart, 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 174, 183 (Ct. App. 2002) (quoting
Jenkins v. County of Orange, 260 Cal. Rptr. 645, 647 (Ct. App. 1989)).
4. See, e.g., Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court, 369 P.2d 937, 940
(Cal. 1962).
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exercises of prosecutorial discretion-in such a sweeping
fashion as to place California's police and prosecutors
absolutely above the law. The Court of Appeal's
interpretation of the statute gives California's public
employees a license to kill, destroy, and defame, maliciously
and without probable cause, as long as their conduct relates
to the investigation or prosecution of crime. However absurd
that may sound, it presently is the law of the land in
California.
This article traces the development of the Court of
Appeal's interpretation of section 821.6 and argues that it is
both misguided and unnecessary. Part I discusses the
language and common law origins of section 821.6, the
Supreme Court's authoritative interpretation of the statute,
and various related immunities, concluding that section 821.6
must be interpreted narrowly as applying only to malicious
prosecution. Part II reviews the development of the Court of
Appeal's contrary interpretation, from the early cases that
omitted relevant Supreme Court decisions altogether through
the more recent decisions that have attempted to distinguish
Supreme Court precedent and have expanded the immunity
beyond recognition. Part III proposes a different analytical
framework for understanding section 821.6 and argues that,
had the Court of Appeal employed the proposed framework, it
could have remained faithful to the Supreme Court's
restrictive interpretation of the statute while still reaching
fair and sensible results in the very cases that applied section
821.6 so expansively.
I. THE NARROW SCOPE OF SECTION 821.6
Section 821.6 provides as follows: "A public employee is
not liable for injury caused by his instituting or prosecuting
any judicial or administrative proceeding within the scope of
his employment, even if he acts maliciously and without
probable cause." The statute was enacted in 1963 as part of
the California Tort Claims Act, a comprehensive codification
of the scope and limits of state and local government tort
liability in California.5 Analysis of the plain language of the
statute, the common law immunity on which it was based, the
5. See generally TIMOTHY T. COATES ET AL., CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT
TORT LIABILITY PRACTICE § 1.2 (4th ed. 2007).
[Vo1:49
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California Supreme Court's interpretation of the statute, and
the statute's relationship to other statutory immunities
leaves little doubt that section 821.6 applies to malicious
prosecution alone.
A. Plain Language, Common Law Origins, and Authoritative
Interpretation
Section 821.6 by its terms applies only to the "instituting
or prosecuting" of a "judicial or administrative proceeding."6
Because malicious prosecution is the only tort action that can
be based on the institution or prosecution of a judicial or
administrative proceeding,7 section 821.6 on its face bars only
suits for malicious prosecution. The California senate
committee comment confirms that interpretation, stating that
"California courts have repeatedly held public entities and
employees immune for this sort of conduct[,1"8 and citing
White v. Towers,9 Coverstone v. Davies,"° Hardy v. Vial, 1 and
Dawson v. Martin.12  All of those cases immunized public
employees and public entities against suits for malicious
prosecution alone. 3  The senate committee comment
6. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 821.6 (Deering 1982 & Supp. 2008).
7. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 791 P.2d 587, 593 (Cal.
1990) ("[Tlhe only common law tort claim that treats the instigation or bringing
of a lawsuit as an actionable injury is the action for malicious prosecution."). As
formulated in the text and in Pacific Gas & Electric, the rule is slightly
oversimplified, because the instigation or prosecution of a proceeding can also
form the basis for an abuse of process claim. For purposes of this article, the
oversimplified statement of the rule suffices, because the availability of abuse of
process claims is not relevant to the issues under discussion.
The rule that malicious prosecution is the only tort action that can be based
on the institution or prosecution of a judicial or administrative proceeding is
neither new nor unique to California law. See 2 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF
TORTS 1229-30 (2001). Rather, it is a standard feature of the common law of
torts. See id. The rationale for the rule is that unless disgruntled litigants are
required to prove the demanding elements of malicious prosecution, including
favorable termination of the underlying litigation, the risk of derivative tort
liability will unduly discourage participation in judicial and other proceedings,
even meritorious ones. See id. at 1213-15, 1229-30.
8. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 821.6 senate committee cmt. (Deering 1982 & Supp.
2008).
9. White v. Towers, 235 P.2d 209 (Cal. 1951).
10. Coverstone v. Davies, 239 P.2d 876 (Cal. 1952).
11. Hardy v. Vial, 311 P.2d 494 (Cal. 1957).
12. Dawson v. Martin, 309 P.2d 915 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957).
13. Dawson, 309 P.2d at 916-17 (holding that the White v. Towers immunity
applies to malicious prosecution suits against not only public employees but also
public entities); Hardy, 311 P.2d at 496-98 (holding that the White v. Towers
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concludes that section 821.6 "continues the existing immunity
for public employees; and, because no statute imposes
liability on public entities for malicious prosecution, public
entities likewise are immune from liability."14
Eleven years after section 821.6 was enacted, the
California Supreme Court authoritatively construed the
statute in Sullivan v. County of Los Angeles.15 In that case,
the plaintiff had sued the county for false imprisonment. 16
The county argued that it was immune under section 821.6,
but the Supreme Court disagreed. 7
The court observed that, in view of the senate committee
comment and the case law on which it relies, "the history of
section 821.6 demonstrates that the Legislature intended the
section to protect public employees from liability only for
malicious prosecution and not for false imprisonment."8 The
court also reasoned that such a "narrow interpretation of
section 821.6's immunity, confining its reach to malicious
prosecution actions," harmonized well with other statutory
immunities.19  Section 821.6 "recognizes the previously
existing immunity of public employees from liability for
malicious prosecution" but leaves untouched "the existing
liability for false imprisonment," which is expressly preserved
by a separate statutory provision. °
Sullivan went on to disapprove a previous decision of the
immunity applies to malicious prosecution suits based on the improper
institution or prosecution of administrative proceedings); Coverstone, 239 P.2d
at 880 (holding that the defendant law enforcement officials were immune
under White v. Towers to suit "for maliciously instituting the criminal
proceeding" against the plaintiffs); White, 235 P.2d at 211 ("[S]ound reasons of
public policy require that a peace officer, or other comparable official, be
shielded by the cloak of immunity from civil liability for alleged malicious
prosecution.").
14. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 821.6 senate committee cmt. (Deering 1982 & Supp.
2008).
15. Sullivan v. County of Los Angeles, 527 P.2d 865, 870-72 (Cal. 1974).
16. Id. at 866.
17. Id. at 870-72.
18. Id. at 870. The tort of false imprisonment "is premised upon a violation
of the personal liberty of another accomplished without lawful authority."
Asgari v. City of Los Angeles, 937 P.2d 273, 278 (Cal. 1997). Malicious
prosecution, in contrast, consists of "procuring the arrest or prosecution of
another under lawful process, but from a malicious motive and without probable
cause." Id.
19. Sullivan, 527 P.2d at 871.
20. Id. (discussing the relationship between section 821.6 and CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 820.4 (Deering 1982 & Supp. 2008)).
[Vo1:49
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Court of Appeal, Watson v. County of Los Angeles,2 and in the
process the Supreme Court explained the rationale for the
immunity codified in section 821.6.22 In Watson, the Court of
Appeal had held that section 821.6 rendered two court clerks
immune from liability for recordkeeping errors that resulted
in the wrongful imprisonment of the plaintiff.23  In
disapproving Watson, Sullivan quoted a treatise by "the
principal architect of the California Tort Claims Act,"24
explaining that the purpose of the section 821.6 immunity
was" 'to prevent interference with [prosecutors' and other law
enforcement officers'] discretionary and quasi-judicial
responsibility for institution and prosecution of enforcement
proceedings.' ",25 Watson erred by extending the immunity to
"'ministerial recordkeeping' " instead of limiting the
immunity to "'the kind of discretionary determination-to
initiate proceedings against the plaintiff-which the
immunity was designed to safeguard.' "26
In 1997, the Supreme Court reaffirmed Sullivan and
further clarified the scope of the immunity that section 821.6
provides.2 7 In Asgari v. City of Los Angeles,2" the issue under
review was whether a police officer's liability for false
imprisonment "may include damages sustained by the
arrestee after the filing of formal charges where, for example,
the officer knowingly presented false evidence to the
prosecutor." 29  The court concluded that damages for false
imprisonment end with the filing of formal charges °.3  The
court reasoned that because of section 821.6, a contrary
conclusion "would produce absurd results" in the following
way:
If a police officer falsely arrested a suspect and then
21. Watson v. County of Los Angeles, 62 Cal. Rptr. 191 (Ct. App. 1967).
22. See Sullivan, 527 P.2d at 871-72.
23. Watson, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 191.
24. Sullivan, 527 P.2d at 871.
25. Id. at 872 (quoting 24 ARVO VAN ALSTYNE, CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT
TORT LIABILITY § 5.63 (1st ed. Supp. 1969)).
26. Id. (quoting VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 25, § 5.63).
27. See Asgari v. City of Los Angeles, 937 P.2d 273 (Cal. 1997).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 275. In stating the issue under review, the court referred to "false
arrest," id., but false arrest is just a form of false imprisonment; they are not
distinct torts. Id. at 278 n.3; see also Collins v. City of San Francisco, 123 Cal.
Rptr. 525, 526 (Ct. App. 1975).
30. Asgari, 937 P.2d at 275.
2009] 397
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knowingly provided false information to the prosecutor,
the officer could be found liable for damages arising from
the entire period of the suspect's incarceration. But the
officer would enjoy absolute immunity if, instead of
arresting the suspect, the officer proceeded directly to the
prosecutor and maliciously and knowingly provided false
information that led to the filing of criminal charges.
Such conduct would constitute malicious prosecution, and
the officer would enjoy absolute immunity from liability
under section 821.6. ... A police officer's liability for
damages arising from the filing of criminal charges, in
conjunction with his or her malicious provision of false
information to the prosecutor, should not depend upon
whether the filing of criminal charges was preceded by an
unlawful arrest.3 '
Thus, because the malicious provision of false
information to prosecutors constitutes malicious prosecution,
and because public employees are absolutely immune to suits
for malicious prosecution under section 821.6, public
employees cannot be liable for damages resulting from the
malicious provision of false information to prosecutors.
Moreover, once formal charges are filed against a criminal
defendant, the defendant's subsequent incarceration is
attributable to the filing of the charges, not to any unlawful
arrest that may have preceded that filing. Recoverable
damages for false arrest must therefore come to an end once
formal charges are filed.
Asgari is significant not only because it shows the
continuing validity of Sullivan's holding-that the section
821.6 immunity applies only to malicious prosecution-but
also because it clarifies the scope of that immunity. As Asgari
explains, prosecutors are not the only potential defendants in
malicious prosecution actions.2  Rather, anyone who
furnishes false information to a prosecutor and thereby
instigates a baseless prosecution can, as a general matter, be
31. Id. at 281-82; see also Jackson v. City of San Diego, 175 Cal. Rptr. 395,
398-401 (Ct. App. 1981) (reaching an identical conclusion about the point at
which false imprisonment damages end and malicious prosecution damages-
which cannot be recovered from public officials under section 821.6-begin).
32. Asgari, 937 P.2d at 282 (stating that if a police officer maliciously and
knowingly provides a prosecutor with false information that leads to the filing




sued for malicious prosecution.3 Public employees such as
police officers, however, are immune to such suits because of
section 821.6, even when they act maliciously and without
probable cause. 4
B. Related Immunities
There are two other statutory immunities that
complement the section 821.6 immunity and, by implication,
support Sullivan and Asgari's interpretation of section 82 1.6's
scope. One relates to public employees' tort liability for law
enforcement conduct in general, and the other relates to the
liability of both public employees and private citizens for
statements made in connection with any official proceedings
authorized by law.
The first statute is California Government Code section
820.4. It provides that "[a] public employee is not liable for
his act or omission, exercising due care, in the execution or
enforcement of any law. Nothing in this section exonerates a
public employee from liability for false arrest or false
imprisonment."35
Two features of the statute bear emphasis. First, the
statute applies to law enforcement conduct in general-any
"act or omission . . . in the execution or enforcement of any
law"36-unlike section 821.6, which applies only to the
institution or prosecution of a judicial or administrative
proceeding. 7 Second, the statute provides for only qualified,
not absolute, immunity-only those "exercising due care"3
are immune-unlike section 821.6, which provides immunity
even for acts undertaken "maliciously and without probable
33. See, e.g., Jacques Interiors v. Petrak, 234 Cal. Rptr. 44, 49 (Ct. App.
1987); Martin Centers v. Dollar Markets, 222 P.2d 136, 143-44 (Cal. Ct. App.
1950); Blancett v. Burr, 279 P. 668, 668-69 (Cal. Ct. App. 1929).
34. The common law immunity on which section 821.6 was based likewise
applied not only to prosecutors but also to other public officials who provide
information to prosecutors to procure meritless prosecutions, even if they act
maliciously and without probable cause. See White v. Towers, 235 P.2d 209,
210-11 (Cal. 1951) (applying the malicious prosecution immunity to a publicly
employed investigator who gave prosecutors information that led to two
unsuccessful prosecutions).
35. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 820.4 (Deering 1982 & Supp. 2008).
36. Id.
37. Id. § 821.6.
38. Id. § 820.4.
2009] 399
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
cause."39
Given the existence of section 820.4, it cannot plausibly
be argued that the absolute immunity codified in section
821.6 applies to law enforcement conduct in general. If it did,
then section 820.4's qualified immunity for that same conduct
would be superfluous. Consequently, the only reasonable
interpretation that harmonizes the two statutes is the
interpretation adopted in Sullivan and reaffirmed in Asgari:
while section 820.4 provides a broad but qualified immunity
for law enforcement conduct in general (except for acts
constituting false imprisonment), section 821.6 provides an
absolute immunity for a specific type of that conduct, namely,
conduct of the sort that can give rise to a malicious
prosecution action.
The second statute is California Civil Code section 47(b).
It creates a "privilege" that bars tort liability for statements
made in connection with various types of proceedings. 4° As
relevant here, the statute provides that, subject to certain
exceptions, any "publication or broadcast" made "in any ...
judicial proceeding," "in any other official proceeding
authorized by law," or "in the initiation or course of any other
proceeding authorized by law" is "privileged."4' This so-called
litigation privilege is absolute, not qualified, and it bars all
tort claims except for malicious prosecution. 42 Thus, if a trial
witness commits perjury and thereby harms one of the
parties to the litigation, the privilege prohibits all tort claims
(e.g., defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
or tortious interference with contractual relations) that the
injured party might bring against the witness, other than
malicious prosecution.
Taken together, the litigation privilege and section 821.6
provide comprehensive immunity from civil liability to public
employees for statements made either during or in the
initiation of any judicial or administrative proceedings. The
litigation privilege bars all claims other than malicious
prosecution, section 821.6 bars malicious prosecution, and
both privileges are absolute. In addition, the litigation
39. Id. § 821.6.
40. See Hagberg v. Cal. Fed. Bank FSB, 81 P.3d 244, 248-49 (Cal. 2004).
41. CAL. CIV. CODE § 47(b) (Deering 2005).
42. See Kimmel v. Goland, 793 P.2d 524, 527 (Cal. 1990); Silberg v.
Anderson, 786 P.2d 365, 370-71 (Cal. 1990).
[Vo1:49
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privilege provides private citizens with absolute immunity
from civil liability for the same conduct (e.g., reporting crime
or testifying at trial), with the exception of suits for malicious
prosecution.4 3
Finally, it should be noted that criminal liability can be
imposed for some of the conduct covered by these immunity
statutes. Perjury is, of course, a crime,44 as is the deliberate
submission of false reports of crime to law enforcement
officials.4 5 The immunities at issue, whether absolute or
qualified, relate only to civil liability.
II. THE COURT OF APPEAL'S BROAD APPLICATION OF SECTION
821.6
Given the Supreme Court's unequivocal limitation of
section 821.6 to malicious prosecution, the application of the
immunity by the lower courts should have been relatively
straightforward. It has, however, been quite the opposite. In
the years since Sullivan, and even after Asgari, the Court of
Appeal has expressly rejected the narrow reading of section
821.6 and has expanded the application of the statute beyond
anything its drafters could possibly have intended.
A. Initial Missteps
The Court of Appeal's first explicit deviation from
Sullivan's interpretation of section 821.6 occurred in 1982.46
In Citizens Capital Corp. v. Spohn,47 the plaintiff private
collection agencies alleged that certain public officials had
conspired to put them out of business by "institut[ing]
widespread newspaper publicity charging them with
improper conduct" and initiating official proceedings to
revoke the collection agencies' licenses.48 The trial court
sustained the defendants' demurrer on the basis of section
43. Hagberg, 81 P.3d at 245, 251. There are also certain narrow exceptions
to the litigation privilege. For example, a police officer may bring a defamation
action against an individual who maliciously files a false complaint of
misconduct against the officer. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 47.5 (Deering 2005); see
also Hagberg, 81 P.3d at 255.
44. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 118, 126 (Deering 2008).
45. Id. § 148.5.
46. See Citizens Capital Corp. v. Spohn, 184 Cal. Rptr. 269 (Ct. App. 1982).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 270.
20091
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821.6, and the collection agencies appealed. 9
The Court of Appeal explained that the collection
agencies' argument on appeal depended upon "their
contention that [section 821.6] is limited to immunity from
malicious prosecution," but the court stated categorically that
the "contention is fallacious."" The court did not mention
Sullivan."' Instead, as its sole support for the assertion that
section 821.6 is not limited to malicious prosecution, the court
cited a then-recent decision of the California Supreme Court,
Kilgore v. Younger. 2
Kilgore likewise did not mention Sullivan.53 But that is
unsurprising, because Kilgore did not involve, and did not
even cite, section 821.6. In Kilgore, the plaintiff sued the
state attorney general and various media outlets for
defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
invasion of privacy.14 The claims were based on the attorney
general's distribution, at a press conference, of a report by a
commission on organized crime, in which the plaintiff was
implicated in illegal bookmaking.5 The Supreme Court held
that the claims against all of the defendants were barred.56
In particular, the claims against the attorney general failed
as a matter of law because the attorney general's conduct was
privileged under a statutory provision protecting any
publication made "[i]n the proper discharge of an official
duty.""7
Kilgore says nothing, even in dictum, about malicious
prosecution or section 821.6. But it was the sole authority on
which Spohn relied for its statement that section 821.6 is not
limited to malicious prosecution.
Two years after Spohn, the Court of Appeal reinforced its
expansion of section 821.6 in Kayfetz v. State.8 In that case,
a physician sued the state of California, two state agencies,
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See Spohn, 184 Cal. Rptr. 269.
52. Kilgore v. Younger, 640 P.2d 793 (Cal. 1982); see Spohn, 184 Cal. Rptr.
269.
53. See Kilgore, 640 P.2d 793.
54. Id. at 795.
55. Id. at 795-96.
56. Id. at 796, 797-800.
57. Id. at 797 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 47(1), currently codified at CAL. CIV.
CODE § 47(a) (Deering 2005)).
58. Kayfetz v. State, 203 Cal. Rptr. 33 (Ct. App. 1984).
402 [Vol:49
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and an agency administrator for damages allegedly caused by
the publication of information concerning disciplinary action
against him.59 The publication, which occurred in an official
"Action Report" that was distributed to hospitals and doctors,
was allegedly misleading in that it implied the physician was
on five years of probation when, in fact, the probation had
been suspended because of the physician's admission to an
60 Th
"impaired physicians" rehabilitation program. The
physician alleged claims for libel, violation of certain
statutory limits on the release of confidential information,
and "breach of an agreement to keep confidential [his]
application to and participation in" the impaired physicians
program.61  The trial court dismissed all of the causes of
action, and the physician appealed.62
The Court of Appeal affirmed on the ground that all of
the physician's claims were barred by section 821.6.63 The
court reasoned that publication of the information in the
"Action Report" was "an integral part of the prosecution
process," and section 821.6 immunizes both the institution
and the prosecution of an administrative proceeding. 64 The
court did not mention Sullivan." Instead, the court stated
that Spohn "demonstrates" that "section 821.6 is not limited
to suits for damages for malicious prosecution."66 As further
support for that proposition, the court cited several other
Court of Appeal cases, all but one of which predated
Sullivan.
The one post-Sullivan decision that Kayfetz relied on
(other than Spohn) was Engel v. McCloskey.68 In that case,
an attorney sued the California state bar, its committee of bar
examiners, and two of the committee's employees for damages
59. Id. at 34.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 35.
62. Id. at 34-35.
63. Id. at 35, 37.
64. Kayfetz v. State, 203 Cal. Rptr. 33, 35, 37 (Ct. App. 1984).
65. See id.
66. Id. at 36.
67. Id. (citing Engel v. McCloskey, 155 Cal. Rptr. 284 (Ct. App. 1979);
Stearns v. County of Los Angeles, 79 Cal. Rptr. 757 (Ct. App. 1969); Brown v.
City of Los Angeles, 73 Cal. Rptr. 364 (Ct. App. 1968)). The Supreme Court
decided Sullivan in 1974. See Sullivan v. County of Los Angeles, 527 P.2d 865
(Cal. 1974).
68. Engel, 155 Cal. Rptr. 284; see Kayfetz, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 36.
2009] 403
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
caused by "an allegedly unlawful delay in his admission to
the California bar while his moral character was being
investigated. ' 9  The trial court dismissed the entire
complaint, and the Court of Appeal affirmed.7 ° With respect
to the attorney's fifth cause of action-for "Blackmail,
Coercion and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Harm"71-
the court concluded that the complaint failed to allege facts
showing the necessary intent.72 But the court also stated
that, even if intent had been adequately alleged, the claim
would have been barred by section 821.6 because it sought
damages for the institution of an administrative proceeding,
namely, the investigation of the attorney's moral character.7 3
The court did not mention that malicious prosecution is the
only tort claim that can be predicated on the institution of an
administrative proceeding.74 In fact, the court said nothing
about either malicious prosecution or Sullivan.75
Again, Spohn and Engel were the only post-Sullivan
authority cited by Kayfetz in support of the proposition that
"section 821.6 is not limited to suits for damages for malicious
prosecution." 76  In addition, the court in Kayfetz expressly
declined to consider whether section 47 of the California Civil
Code-which creates both the litigation privilege, the "proper
discharge of an official duty" privilege relied on in Kilgore,
and other privileges-protected the publication of the
information in the "Action Report." 7  But given the court's
holding that the publication of the "Action Report" was "an
integral part of the prosecution process,"78 it is not easy to see
how the publication could fail to be privileged under section
47(b), which protects any publication made in an "official
proceeding authorized by law."79
After Spohn and Kayfetz unequivocally stated that
section 821.6 is not limited to malicious prosecution,
69. Engel, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 285.
70. Id. at 288.
71. Id. at 287 (emphasis omitted).
72. Id. at 291-93.
73. Id. at 293.
74. See id.; see also supra note 7.
75. See Engel v. McCloskey, 155 Cal. Rptr. 284 (Ct. App. 1979).
76. Kayfetz v. State, 203 Cal. Rptr. 33, 36 (Ct. App. 1984).
77. Id. at 37.
78. Id.
79. CAL. CIV. CODE § 47(b) (Deering 2005).
404 [Vo1:49
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Sullivan's central holding-that section 821.6 is precisely so
limited-became a dead letter. In case after case, the Court
of Appeal has distinguished Sullivan or ignored it altogether,
and the court has relied upon and expanded the broad
interpretation of section 821.6 that originated in Spohn and
Kayfetz. 8
B. Limiting Sullivan
Neither Spohn nor Kayfetz (nor Engel) discussed or even
cited Sullivan."l But two years after Kayfetz, the Court of
Appeal decided another case, Randle v. City of San Francisco,
in which it expressly rejected Sullivan's narrow reading of
section 821.6 and adopted Spohn and Kayfetz's expansive
reading instead. s2 In Randle, the plaintiff had sued a district
attorney, a police officer, and the city and county
governments for damages caused by the alleged withholding
of exculpatory evidence when the plaintiff was prosecuted for,
and convicted of, rape. 3 The trial court dismissed the
plaintiffs state law claims, and the plaintiff appealed.' 4
The Court of Appeal concluded that all of the state law
claims were barred by section 821.6.5 In so doing, the court
relied on Kayfetz and one pre-Sullivan case as its sole
authority for rejecting the plaintiffs argument that section
821.6 "immunizes only conduct analogous to the tort of
malicious prosecution." 6 The court did not, however, ignore
Sullivan." Rather, it said that Sullivan and other cases that
the plaintiff cited "as limiting the immunity under section
821.6 do so in the specific context of distinguishing actions for
malicious prosecution from ones for false arrest or false
imprisonment.""8 The court concluded that although the
cases cited by the plaintiff, including Sullivan, "preclude
application of section 821.6 to suits for false arrest or
80. See infra Part II.B-C.
81. See Kayfetz, 203 Cal. Rptr 33; Citizens Capital Corp. v. Spohn, 184 Cal.
Rptr. 269 (Ct. App. 1982); Engel, 155 Cal. Rptr 284.
82. See Randle v. City of San Francisco, 230 Cal. Rptr. 901 (Ct. App. 1986).
83. Id. at 902. The conviction was eventually overturned, prompting the
plaintiff to file his civil action. Id. at 902-03.
84. Id. at 903.
85. Id. at 905.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Randle v. City of San Francisco, 230 Cal. Rptr. 901, 905 (Ct. App. 1986).
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imprisonment, they do not preclude its application to suits
alleging conduct other than malicious prosecution which
comes within the terms of the immunity provision."89
The Randle court thus read Sullivan as holding only that
section 821.6 does not apply to false imprisonment. 90 But the
court did not mention Sullivan's basis for refusing to apply
section 821.6 to false imprisonment, namely, that the statute
applies only to malicious prosecution. 91 The Randle court
appears to have believed-incorrectly-that it could treat
those statements in Sullivan as mere dicta, because Sullivan
was really just a false imprisonment case.
Later cases followed Randle's approach of limiting
Sullivan to the proposition that section 821.6 does not bar
claims for false imprisonment.92 In Jenkins v. County of
Orange,93 the mother and maternal grandparents of a young
boy sued an emergency response social worker and the county
that employed her, alleging claims for negligence, intentional
or negligent infliction of emotional distress, false
imprisonment, and federal constitutional violations.94 On
appeal after the trial court dismissed the complaint, the
appellate court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that, under
Sullivan, section 821.6 "provides a public employee with
immunity from liability only for malicious prosecution and
does not immunize the public employee from other claims of
misconduct [such as negligence and misrepresentation of
evidence] . ' The court reasoned that the plaintiffs presented
"too broad an interpretation of Sullivan[,] which limited its
holding and discussion to the lack of immunity for false
imprisonment."9 6 The court then proceeded to apply Spohn
and Kayfetz's interpretation of the statutory immunity, citing
both cases as establishing that "section 821.6 is not limited to




92. See, e.g., Gillan v. City of San Marino, 55 Cal. Rptr. 3d 158 (Ct. App.
2007); Amylou R. v. County of Riverside, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 319 (Ct. App. 1994);
Cappuccio, Inc. v. Harmon, 257 Cal. Rptr. 4 (Ct. App. 1989); Jenkins v. County
of Orange, 260 Cal. Rptr. 645 (Ct. App. 1989).
93. Jenkins, 260 Cal. Rptr. 645.
94. Id. at 646-47.





The court in Cappuccio, Inc. v. Harmon, which was
decided the same year as Jenkins, took the same approach.9
There the court dismissed Sullivan as holding only that
section 821.6 "does not apply to a prosecution for false
imprisonment."99  The court never mentioned malicious
prosecution. 100
Amylou R. v. County of Riverside,1"1 decided five years
later, is similar. The court cited Sullivan only to show that "it
is settled that section 821.6 does not provide immunity for
claims for false imprisonment," and the court again failed to
mention malicious prosecution at all.1°2 Similarly, in Gillan
v. City of San Marino, °3 the court cited Sullivan for the
proposition that section 821.6 "provides no immunity from
liability for false arrest or false imprisonment" but failed to
note that Sullivan's basis for that holding was that section
821.6 applies to malicious prosecution alone.104
By reading Sullivan as holding only that the section
821.6 immunity does not apply to false imprisonment, the
Court of Appeal freed itself to apply the immunity to every
other claim a plaintiff might bring against a public official.
Thus liberated, the court proceeded to apply the immunity
well beyond the limits that Sullivan-and the text and
history of section 821.6-had actually imposed.
98. Cappuccio, Inc. v. Harmon, 257 Cal. Rptr. 4 (Ct. App. 1989).
99. Id. at 7.
100. Cappuccio involved a successful prosecution of a seafood merchant for
underweighing squid purchased from fishermen. Id. at 5. After the merchant
was convicted, one of the investigating officers for California's Department of
Fish and Game made a public announcement in which he grossly overstated the
amount of the underweighing (1,391,690 pounds instead of 295,300 pounds in
1979, and 1,925,627 pounds instead of 171,175 pounds in 1980). Id. The
merchant sued for defamation, but the Court of Appeal concluded that the claim
was barred by section 821.6. Id. Given that the prosecution was successful, the
merchant could not and did not try to sue for malicious prosecution. See, e.g.,
Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 791 P.2d 587, 594 (Cal. 1990)
(stating that a malicious prosecution plaintiff must prove favorable termination
of the underlying action). Thus, if the court had followed Sullivan's holding that
section 821.6 applies only to malicious prosecution, the statute would have had
nothing to do with the merchant's suit.
101. Amylou R. v. County of Riverside, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 319 (Ct. App. 1994).
102. Id. at 322 n.2.
103. Gillan v. City of San Marino, 55 Cal. Rptr. 3d 158 (Ct. App. 2007).
104. Id. at 171.
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C. Expanding Spohn and Kayfetz
The Court of Appeal continued to develop its expansive
interpretation of section 821.6 in two largely separate lines of
cases. First, in an early series of decisions, the court adopted
the doctrine that because investigation is a necessary
precursor to prosecution, it is a part of the prosecution
process and hence is covered by the section 821.6 immunity.0 5
Although the results reached in those early cases were
probably correct, 1 6 the doctrine on which they were based
was fundamentally misguided and pernicious, as subsequent
cases showed. Second, the court decided to apply the
immunity to virtually any prosecution-related public
statement made by a public employee, including both
provably false postconviction statements and announcements
that the authorities had decided not to prosecute at all.107 In
both of these ways, the court stretched section 821.6 beyond
anything that the statutory language, legislative history,
Supreme Court precedent, or common sense permitted.
1. Immunity for Investigative Conduct
The first line of cases began in 1988 with Kemmerer v.
County of Fresno.'° In that case, a county social services
agency terminated one of its employees after investigating
charges of misconduct against him.' The employee
prevailed in an administrative appeal of the termination and
was reinstated, with all back pay and benefits restored." 0 He
then sued the county and two of his superiors for breach of
contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
105. See Gillan v. City of San Marino, 55 Cal. Rptr. 3d 158 (Ct. App. 2007);
Javor v. Taggart, 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 174 (Ct. App. 2002); Baughman v.
California, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 82 (Ct. App. 1995); Amylou R. v. County of
Riverside, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 319 (Ct. App. 1994); Gensburg v. Miller, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 97 (Ct. App. 1994); Ronald S. v. County of San Diego, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d
418 (Ct. App. 1993); Alicia T. v. County of Los Angeles, 271 Cal. Rptr. 513 (Ct.
App. 1990); Jenkins v. County of Orange, 260 Cal. Rptr. 645, 647 (Ct. App.
1989); Kemmerer v. County of Fresno, 246 Cal. Rptr. 609 (Ct. App. 1988).
106. See infra Part III.B.
107. See Ingram v. Flippo, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 60 (Ct. App. 1999); Cappuccio,
Inc. v. Harmon, 257 Cal. Rptr. 4 (Ct. App. 1989).
108. Kemmerer, 246 Cal. Rptr. 609.
109. Id. at 611-12.
110. Id. at 612.
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intentional interference with contractual relations."1 The
trial court dismissed the complaint, and the employee
appealed.'12
The Court of Appeal concluded that the emotional
distress claim was barred by section 821.6."' Without
mentioning Sullivan, the court cited Spohn and Kayfetz for
the proposition that section 821.6 is not "limited to suits for
damages for malicious prosecution, although that is a
principal use of the statute.""4 The court then noted that the
plaintiffs superiors had "initiated formal disciplinary
proceedings," "conducted an investigation," and "filed an
interoffice memorandum detailing the investigation and
recommending dismissal of" the plaintiff." 5  The court
concluded that all of that conduct was immunized under
section 821.6 because the disciplinary process was a covered
administrative proceeding, and even "[t]he investigation ...
was an essential step to the institution of the disciplinary
process and [was] also cloaked with immunity." 16
Just one year later, Jenkins echoed Kemmerer's
reasoning that an "investigation" by a public official is
"cloaked with immunity" because it is an "essential step"
toward institution of a formal proceeding." 7 In Jenkins, the
court held that a county social worker's investigation of a
child abuse complaint was absolutely immune under section
821.6.118 The court did not, however, cite Kemmerer, but
instead relied upon a single pre-Sullivan case." 9  The
following year, in Alicia T. v. County of Los Angeles, 120 the
court relied upon Jenkins in again holding that publicly
employed social workers "enjoy absolute immunity from
liability arising out of investigation of child abuse and
111. Id. at 612-13.
112. Id. at 610.
113. Id. at 614-15. The court affirmed the dismissal of the contract-based
claims on the ground that civil service employment is governed not by contract
but by statute. Id. at 612-13.
114. Kemmerer v. County of Fresno, 246 Cal. Rptr. 609, 615 (Ct. App. 1988)
(citation omitted).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 615-16.
117. Jenkins v. County of Orange, 260 Cal. Rptr. 645, 647 (Ct. App. 1989).
118. Id. at 646, 648.
119. See id. at 647-48 (citing Blackburn v. County of Los Angeles, 116 Cal.
Rptr. 622 (Ct. App. 1974)).
120. Alicia T. v. County of Los Angeles, 271 Cal. Rptr. 513 (Ct. App. 1990).
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instigation of dependency proceedings." 2' A few years later,
Ronald S. v. County of San Diego122 relied on both Jenkins
and Alicia T. in holding that section 821.6 barred "claims of
negligence" concerning "the activities of social workers" and a
county government "in the process of administering an
adoption." 2' And one year after that, in Gensburg v. Miller,'24
the court again cited Jenkins as authority for the proposition
that section 821.6 precludes all state law liability for "actions
taken in the investigation and prosecution of license
suspension and revocation proceedings against foster
parents."' 2 '
Having thus created an absolute immunity for
investigations that are conducted by public officials, the court
broadened the immunity still further in Amylou R. v. County
of Riverside.1 26  In that case, two teenage girls had been
abducted and raped, and one of them murdered, apparently
by a stranger.'2 ' In the course of the police investigation of
121. Id. at 516, 519.
122. Ronald S. v. County of San Diego, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 418 (Ct. App. 1993).
123. Id. at 425-26.
In the years between Alicia T. and Ronald S., the Court of Appeal also
decided Shoemaker v. Myers, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 203 (Ct. App. 1992), and Jager v.
County of Alameda, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 293 (Ct. App. 1992), both of which broadly
applied section 821.6 in other ways. In Shoemaker, the court relied on both
Kemmerer and a case that predated section 821.6 in holding that section 821.6
barred a claim by a health department investigator for wrongful termination in
violation of public policy. See Shoemaker, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 205, 214. Quite
apart from Sullivan's limitation of section 821.6 to claims for malicious
prosecution, Shoemaker is difficult to understand, because it is not clear that
the case involved the institution or prosecution of an administrative or judicial
proceeding at all.
In Jager, the court held that section 821.6 barred claims for negligent and
intentional "interference with economic relationship" that were based on a
district attorney's erroneous release of a child support judgment lien before the
child support arrearage had been paid in full. See Jager, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
294-95. The district attorney's alleged misconduct seemed to be the result of a
record-keeping error, because the plaintiff had allegedly informed the district
attorney's office of the correct amount of the arrearage. Id. at 294. Thus,
independently of Sullivan's limitation of section 821.6 to claims for malicious
prosecution, the section 821.6 immunity probably should not have applied,
because Sullivan specifically disapproved an earlier case that had applied
section 821.6 to immunize a record-keeping error by a court clerk. See Sullivan
v. County of Los Angeles, 527 P.2d 865, 871-72 (Cal. 1974) (disapproving
Watson v. County of Los Angeles, 62 Cal. Rptr. 191 (Ct. App. 1967)).
124. Gensburg v. Miller, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 97 (Ct. App. 1994).
125. Id. at 99.
126. Amylou R. v. County of Riverside, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 319 (Ct. App. 1994).
127. Id. at 320-21.
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the crime, "an antagonistic relationship developed" between
the survivor, Amylou, and the investigating officers. 128 The
officers came to suspect that Amylou "knew more than she
was telling them," and they said so, "first to Amylou and then
to her friends and neighbors." 129  For example, certain
detectives "told neighbors that Amylou was lying, that she
was not cooperating with the investigation, and that 'there
was more to [her] involvement than meets the eye.' ,,130 One
detective "told the mother of another girl at Amylou's school
that Amylou knew the man who committed the crimes, that
she was not the victim she presented herself to be, and that
she was involved in the crimes. '13' Amylou ultimately sued
the county for negligence, assault, false imprisonment,
slander, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional
distress. 132 The false imprisonment and emotional distress
claims were tried to a jury, which awarded Amylou $325,000
in damages.133
The Court of Appeal concluded that the claim for
emotional distress was barred by section 821.6.13 The court
explained that section 821.6 "is not limited to the act of filing
a criminal complaint" but rather "extends to actions taken in
preparation for formal proceedings." 3 ' Thus, relying on
Kemmerer, Jenkins, and a pair of pre-Sullivan cases, the
court concluded that "[b]ecause investigation is an 'essential
step' toward the institution of formal proceedings, it 'is also
cloaked with immunity.' ",136 On that basis, the court
reasoned that because "the acts of which Amylou complains
are incidental to the investigation of the crimes, and since
investigation is part of the prosecution of a judicial
proceeding, those acts were committed in the course of the
prosecution of that proceeding."1 37  The court further
concluded that section 821.6 bars not only claims by the
128. Id. at 320.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 322.
131. Id.
132. Amylou R. v. County of Riverside, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 319, 320 (Ct. App.
1994).
133. Id.
134. See generally id. at 320-24.
135. Id. at 321.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 322.
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"target of the judicial or administrative proceeding" (i.e., the
man who had abducted Amylou and her friend) but also
precludes "liability for injuries suffered by others, such as
witnesses or victims."13  Amylou's claim for emotional
distress based on the detectives' investigative conduct was
therefore barred.139
Before proceeding to the court's application of this
reasoning in subsequent cases, it is worth pausing to consider
the breadth of Amylou R.'s construction of the section 821.6
immunity. Under Amylou R., police officers are immune to
liability for any injuries caused by their conduct in the course
of investigating crime, even if they act maliciously and
without probable cause, and even if the injuries are suffered
by innocent bystanders. 140 Thus, for example, police
searching the home of a criminal suspect would be immune to
liability if they were to shoot an innocent witness who
happened to be present in the home, even if the shooting were
malicious and without probable cause.
Although the Court of Appeal has not yet had the
opportunity to apply the immunity in precisely that context,
it has applied it elsewhere to reach similarly absurd results.
In Baughman v. California,141 police obtained a warrant to
search certain premises for stolen computer equipment. 142
The plaintiff, a designer of computer hardware and software,
rented space at the subject premises, but he was not named
in the warrant and thus was not a target of the search. 4 1 In
138. Amylou R. v. County of Riverside, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 319, 322 (Ct. App.
1994).
139. Id. The court's extension of the immunity to bar claims by witnesses or
victims who were not targets of the judicial or administrative proceeding
appears difficult to defend, given (1) the detectives' claim that Amylou "was not
the victim she presented herself to be" and "was involved in the crimes," and (2)
the court's conclusion that investigation is part of the prosecution process. Id.
at 322. That is, because Amylou was a target of the investigation, which the
court said was part of the prosecution process, the court's own reasoning
suggests that she was a target of the judicial proceeding even though she was
never prosecuted. In any event, even if Amylou was not a target of the judicial
proceeding, she certainly was a target of the investigation. The case thus did
not present the need or even the opportunity to extend the immunity to bar
claims by mere witnesses or victims who were never even targets of the
investigation. But that is precisely what the court did.
140. See Amylou R., 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 319.
141. Baughman v. California, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 82 (Ct. App. 1995).
142. Id. at 85.
143. Id. at 85, 89.
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the course of their three-day search, the police "destroyed
floppy computer disks containing the sole source of [the
plaintiffs] research over many years. These disks were not
described in the search warrant."' 4" The plaintiff filed suit
against the state and certain police officers and other
government employees, alleging claims for invasion of
privacy, conversion, and intentional and negligent infliction of
emotional distress. 14' The defendants prevailed on all claims,
and the plaintiff appealed.
146
On appeal, the court held that the conversion claim was
barred by section 821.6.147 After quoting and discussing
Amylou R.'s interpretation of the statute at length, the court
concluded that the plaintiffs claim failed as a matter of law
because "section 821.6 shields investigative officers from
liability for injuries suffered by witnesses or victims during
an investigation."148 The court also emphasized the absolute
nature of the immunity, observing that "the officers' actions
during the investigation were cloaked with immunity, even if
they had acted negligently, maliciously or without probable
cause in carrying out their duties."1 49  As a result, the
defendant police officers had absolute "immunity for the loss
[the plaintif] suffered as a result of their investigation."5 °
Two more recent cases have confirmed the continuing
vitality of the Court of Appeal's interpretation of section 821.6
as immunizing investigative conduct.'' In Javor v.
Taggart, 5 2 the plaintiff was a licensed general contractor.'
53
A state agency had mistakenly concluded that the plaintiff
was the employer of a construction worker who had suffered a
workplace injury, and that the plaintiff did not have workers'
compensation insurance at the time of the injury. 114 The
agency "paid benefits to the injured worker and recorded a
144. Id. at 85.
145. Id. at 84, 85 n.1.
146. Id. at 85.
147. Baughman v. California, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 82, 87-88 (Ct. App. 1995).
148. Id. at 89.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See Gillan v. City of San Marino, 55 Cal. Rptr. 3d 158 (Ct. App. 2007);
Javor v. Taggart, 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 174 (Ct. App. 2002).
152. Javor, 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 174.
153. Id. at 177.
154. Id.
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lien against the plaintiff's residence."' 5 The plaintiff pursued
his administrative remedies and ultimately succeeded in
getting the lien canceled. 15 6 He then filed suit against three
employees of the agency, alleging federal civil rights
violations as well as "slander and clouding of title, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and violation of
the state Constitution." '57 The trial court dismissed all of the
claims, and the plaintiff appealed. 5 8
The Court of Appeal quoted extensively from the cases
that have interpreted section 821.6 broadly, stating that
"section 821.6 is not limited to only malicious prosecution
actions" 5 9 and that "[b]ecause investigation is an essential
step toward the institution of formal proceedings, it is also
cloaked with immunity.'' 60 The court went on to observe that
when the defendant public officials perform their official
duties, "[tiheir decisions are made in the course of
investigations and also through formal administrative
proceedings."161 Thus, because the immunity applies to both
investigations and formal proceedings, the court concluded
that section 821.6 barred all of the plaintiffs tort claims.'62
In Gillan v. City of San Marino'63-the most recent case
applying the immunity for investigative conduct-the
plaintiff was a high school basketball coach who was accused
of sexually molesting a student.1 64  The police arrested the
plaintiff without a warrant, booked but released him because
they lacked sufficient grounds for filing a criminal complaint,
and then issued a press release and held a press briefing
concerning the case.165 At the press briefing, an officer
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 178.
158. Javor v. Taggart, 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 174, 178 (Ct. App. 2002).
159. Id. at 183 (quoting Jenkins v. County of Orange, 260 Cal. Rptr. 645, 647
(Ct. App. 1989)) (citation omitted).
160. Id. at 183 (quoting Amylou R. v. County of Riverside, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d
319, 321-22 (Ct. App. 1994)) (citation omitted).
161. Id. at 184.
162. Id. at 183-85. It is not clear from the opinion whether the court thought
that the defendants had ever initiated or prosecuted any kind of formal
proceeding against the plaintiff. In particular, it is not clear whether the court
thought that the recording of a lien constituted the initiation or prosecution of a
formal proceeding within the meaning of section 821.6.
163. Gillan v. City of San Marino, 55 Cal. Rptr. 3d 158 (Ct. App. 2007).
164. Id. at 163-64.
165. Id. at 164-65 & n.2.
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identified the plaintiff by name, said it was alleged that the
plaintiff had "sexually molested a member of last year's girl's
basketball team" who "was 17 years old at the time," claimed
that there was "supporting evidence" for that charge, and
added that the authorities were trying to determine whether
there were any additional victims.166  The press release
likewise stated that "[tihe assistance of the media is greatly
appreciated in the event there are additional victims yet to be
identified."167  No additional witnesses or accusers ever
materialized, however, and the district attorney ultimately
declined to prosecute even the original charge, citing a "lack
of sufficient corroboration." 168 The plaintiff filed suit against
the city and three of its police officers, alleging claims for
defamation, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress, as well as one statutory cause of action. 169
The plaintiff eventually dismissed the invasion of privacy
claim, but the remaining claims were tried to a jury, which
found in favor of the plaintiff on each cause of action and
awarded $4,453,000 in compensatory damages, plus punitive
damages and attorneys' fees.170
On appeal, the court concluded that section 821.6 barred
the claims for defamation and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. 7' The court began its analysis with the
observation that "California courts construe section 821.6
broadly in furtherance of its purpose to protect public
employees in the performance of their prosecutorial duties
from the threat of harassment through civil suits."'72 The
court went on to apply Amylou R.'s holding that an
investigation "is part of the prosecution of a judicial
proceeding for purposes of the statute," so "[a]cts undertaken
in the course of an investigation, including press releases
166. Id. at 164.
167. Id.
168. Id. (citation omitted).
169. Gillan v. City of San Marino, 55 Cal. Rptr. 3d 158, 164 (Ct. App. 2007).
170. Id. at 165-67.
171. Id. at 170. The court concluded that section 821.6 did not bar the
plaintiffs statutory cause of action because it was, in effect, a claim for false
arrest. Id. at 172-73.
172. Id. at 170. Read as a descriptive claim, the court's observation is
certainly correct: the California courts have construed section 821.6 very
broadly. But read as a normative claim-that the courts should construe the
statute broadly-the court's observation appears to be in direct defiance of the
Supreme Court's limitation of the immunity to claims for malicious prosecution.
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reporting the progress or results of the investigation, cannot
give rise to liability."1 73 Because the "press releases and other
public statements" made by the defendant officials "were
made in the course of their investigation of a purported crime
and in furtherance of the investigation," they were protected
by section 821.6 against claims for defamation and emotional
distress. 17 4
2. Immunity for Prosecution-Related Public Statements
The second line of cases developing the Court of Appeal's
expansive interpretation of section 821.6 consists of just two
cases, Cappuccio, Inc. v. Harmon17' and Ingram v. Flippo,176
both of which were cited in Gillan.177  In Cappuccio, the
plaintiff seafood merchant was convicted of underweighing
squid purchased from fishermen. 17 8 One of the prosecuting
agency's investigating officers later made a public statement
that grossly overstated the amount of underweighing, and the
merchant sued for defamation.'79 The court concluded that
the merchant's claim was barred by section 821.6.180 The
court reasoned that even if the injury-producing conduct
occurred "after the prosecution had been terminated," the
conduct was still immune under section 821.6 as long as the
injury was "caused by the initiation or prosecution of the
proceeding"; "the test of immunity is causal connection, not
time of occurrence." 8' At the same time, the court concluded
that the defendant's statements, which were merely a "report
on the outcome" of the prosecution, constituted "part of the
prosecution process" and therefore were covered by section
821.6.182
In Ingram, some individuals had complained to the local
district attorney about alleged violations of the Brown Act
173. Id. at 171.
174. Gillan v. City of San Marino, 55 Cal. Rptr. 3d 158, 172 (Ct. App. 2007).
175. Cappuccio, Inc. v. Harmon, 257 Cal. Rptr. 4 (Ct. App. 1989).
176. Ingram v. Flippo, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 60 (Ct. App. 1999).
177. Gillan, 55 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 171.
178. Cappuccio, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 5.
179. Id. The officer said that the amount of underweighing was 1,391,690
pounds in 1979 and 1,925,627 pounds in 1980, but the actual figures were
295,300 pounds and 171,175 pounds. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 7.
416 [Vol:49
LAWLESS LAW ENFORCEMENT
(California's open meeting law) by the local school board.183
The district attorney investigated the complaint but
ultimately declined to file either a criminal or a civil
enforcement action. l ' 4 The district attorney did, however, say
in a public statement that one or more unidentified board
members had violated the Brown Act. 8 5 One of the board
members then filed suit against the district attorney, but the
trial court dismissed her complaint.186 The Court of Appeal
held that insofar as the complaint could be construed either
as alleging a claim for defamation or as attempting to enjoin
the district attorney from interfering with the plaintiffs free
speech rights, the claims were barred by section 821.6.187
Citing Spohn, Kayfetz, and Cappuccio, the court reasoned
that the immunity applied even though the district attorney
never instituted a prosecution of the plaintiff, because the
district attorney's public statements were all "part of the
prosecution process as that term is understood in the context
of section 821.6. " l18
Between them, these two lines of cases give California
public employees an immunity that is both sweeping and
absolute. They can literally do whatever they want in the
course of an investigation and never have to answer to their
victims under state law. They can also make any public
statements they want, either preprosecution or
postconviction, and they can even seek the media's assistance
in disseminating their slanders, all without incurring any
state law liability.
III. A BETrER ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
What happened here? California's legislature enacted a
statutory immunity concerning claims for malicious
prosecution in order to protect public officials' exercise of
prosecutorial discretion. The California Supreme Court held
that the statute is limited to malicious prosecution. 8 9 But in
the hands of the Court of Appeal, the statute grew to provide
183. Ingram v. Flippo, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 60, 62-63 (Ct. App. 1999).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 63.
187. Id. at 68.
188. Id.
189. Sullivan v. County of Los Angeles, 527 P.2d 865, 870 (Cal. 1974).
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absolute tort immunity for all police investigative conduct
and for false statements made by government officials
concerning investigations or successful prosecutions.' 90
The Court of Appeal's radical expansion of the immunity
is unjustified both as a matter of law and as a matter of
policy. The court could and should have charted a very
different course if it had properly understood a few basic legal
principles concerning both Sullivan and the malicious
prosecution immunity. Sound application of those principles
would have enabled the court to restrict section 821.6 to
malicious prosecution while still reaching intuitively just
results in the very cases that drove the expansion of the
immunity.
A. Rediscovering the Key Legal Principles
The first important point is that the Court of Appeal's
attempts to limit Sullivan are legally indefensible. Sullivan
held that the section 821.6 immunity does not apply to false
imprisonment because section 821.6 applies to malicious
prosecution alone.19' Thus, the limitation to malicious
prosecution was part of the court's holding, so the Court of
Appeal was not at liberty to jettison it.192 Moreover, if the
Court of Appeal were right that Sullivan had held only that
section 821.6 does not apply to false imprisonment, and that
Sullivan's limitation of section 821.6 to malicious prosecution
was mere dictum, 193 then it would be impossible for the
Supreme Court ever to hold that the statute applies only to
malicious prosecution. Rather, no matter how often the
Supreme Court rejected the application of section 821.6 to
particular causes of action on the ground that the immunity
applies to malicious prosecution alone, the Court of Appeal
would remain free to discount the restriction to malicious
prosecution as dictum and to limit the Supreme Court's
190. See supra Part II.
191. See generally supra Part I.A.
192. See, e.g., Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court, 369 P.2d 937, 940
(Cal. 1962) ("Courts exercising inferior jurisdiction must accept the law declared
by courts of superior jurisdiction. It is not their function to attempt to overrule
decisions of a higher court."); Bunch v. Coachella Valley Water Dist., 262 Cal.
Rptr. 513, 518 (Ct. App. 1989) (explaining that "the ratio decidendi of a
Supreme Court opinion ... is fully binding as precedent on the lower courts of
this state").
193. See generally supra Part II.B.
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decisions to the specific causes of action that the Supreme
Court addressed. Such a result would be absurd. If the
Supreme Court says that section 821.6 does not apply to false
imprisonment because it applies to malicious prosecution
alone, then the statute applies to malicious prosecution alone.
The second important point is that limiting the immunity
to malicious prosecution does not mean allowing plaintiffs to
plead around the immunity by basing their claims on legal
theories other than malicious prosecution. If it did, then the
immunity would indeed provide little meaningful protection,
because plaintiffs would always be able to recast their
complaints in terms of defamation, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, interference with business relations, or
the like. That is, if pleading a different legal theory were all
that it took to get around the immunity, then any plaintiff
who sought to recover damages from a public official for the
institution or prosecution of a judicial or administrative
proceeding could get around the immunity by alleging, for
example, that the institution or prosecution of the proceeding
constituted intentional infliction of emotional distress.
No such evasion of the immunity is possible, however, for
two reasons. First, malicious prosecution is the only tort
action that can be based on the institution or prosecution of a
judicial or administrative proceeding.19 Second, any
statements made in any "judicial proceeding" or "in any other
official proceeding authorized by law" are absolutely
privileged against all claims other than malicious
prosecution. 195 Thus, were an acquitted criminal defendant to
sue the prosecutor on the ground that the unsuccessful
criminal prosecution itself constituted intentional infliction of
emotional distress, the claim would fail as a matter of law.
But the reason the claim would fail has nothing to do with
governmental tort immunity in general or with section 821.6
in particular. Rather, it is purely a matter of the common law
of torts and the litigation privilege-the only tort claim
available to the plaintiff arising from the conduct in question
would be malicious prosecution. And that claim would be
barred by section 821.6, because a criminal prosecutor is a
194. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 791 P.2d 587, 593-94 (Cal.
1990); see also supra note 7.
195. CAL. CIV. CODE § 47(b) (Deering 2005).
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public official. 196
The third important point is that all of this reasoning
applies to all claims for damages caused by the institution or
prosecution of judicial or administrative proceedings,
including claims against officials who, though not prosecutors
themselves, provide information to prosecutors or otherwise
instigate prosecutions. Suppose, for example, that some
parents believe they have been harmed by the prosecution of
a meritless juvenile dependency petition, and they believe
that the prosecution was the result of an improper and
malicious investigation performed by a state-employed social
worker. Because the parents' alleged damages arise from the
institution and prosecution of a judicial proceeding, their only
available tort claim, even against the social worker, would be
for malicious prosecution. And, in the absence of section
821.6, the parents would be able to sue the social worker for
malicious prosecution, because anyone who furnishes false
information to a prosecutor in order to procure a baseless
prosecution can, as a general matter, be sued for malicious
prosecution. But because of section 821.6, the state-employed
social worker would be immune.'97
Indeed, in one of the original cases creating the common
law immunity on which section 821.6 was based, the Supreme
Court applied the immunity to a state-employed investigator
who had signed affidavits on which two unsuccessful criminal
prosecutions were based. 9 ' Thus, the immunity has always
barred malicious prosecution actions not only against
prosecuting authorities but also against investigators and
196. See, e.g., Scannell v. County of Riverside, 199 Cal. Rptr. 644, 650-51 (Ct.
App. 1984) (affirming the dismissal of a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress based on the institution of a meritless criminal prosecution,
because the only possible claim based on such conduct would be malicious
prosecution, which was barred by section 821.6).
197. See Collins v. City of San Francisco, 123 Cal. Rptr. 525, 526-28 (Ct. App.
1975) (affirming summary judgment for the defense because, although the
plaintiff alleged a claim for false imprisonment, the defendant police officer's
improper signing of an affidavit in order to procure an improper arrest and
prosecution of the plaintiff gave rise only to a claim for malicious prosecution,
which was barred by section 821.6); see also Tur v. City of Los Angeles, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 470, 471 (Ct. App. 1996) (holding that section 821.6 barred a malicious
prosecution claim against two firefighters who instigated a meritless criminal
prosecution of the plaintiff by deliberately providing misleading information to
the city attorney).
198. See White v. Towers, 235 P.2d 209, 210-11 (Cal. 1951).
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other public employees who procure or instigate prosecutions.
None of the foregoing principles-(1) that Sullivan held
that section 821.6 is limited to malicious prosecution, (2) that
the immunity nonetheless bars all liability for damages
arising from the institution or prosecution of a judicial or
administrative proceeding because malicious prosecution is
the only tort action that could be based on such damages, and
(3) that the immunity covers not only prosecutors but also
those who instigate prosecutions-should be controversial.
But despite their soundness and importance, they have
generally been absent from the Court of Appeal case law
concerning section 821.6.
B. Rethinking the Case Law
Had the Court of Appeal commanded a clear view of
those legal principles, it would have been able to reach correct
and satisfying results in the cases reviewed in Part II.C
without relying on a blanket immunity for investigative
conduct. In Kemmerer, for example, the plaintiff was a
county employee who had been the target of an investigation
by his employer, which led to a formal disciplinary proceeding
and ultimately his termination.'99 The case does not indicate,
however, that the plaintiff alleged he was harmed by the
investigation itself-he claimed only that he was harmed by
the disciplinary proceeding and consequent termination. For
that reason, the court should have concluded that the
plaintiffs only available claim, even against the investigators,
was for malicious prosecution. And because the investigators
were public employees, a malicious prosecution claim would
have been barred by section 821.6. Thus, the court could
have reached exactly the same result-affirmance of the
dismissal of the complaint-without holding that
"investigation" is an "essential step" in the prosecution
process and therefore is "cloaked with immunity."2 °0
Similar observations apply to Jenkins, Alicia T., and
Ronald S. Insofar as the plaintiffs in those cases sought to
recover damages caused by the institution or prosecution of
formal proceedings, rather than damages caused
199. Kemmerer v. County of Fresno, 246 Cal. Rptr. 609, 611-12, 615 (Ct.
App. 1988).
200. Id. at 615-16.
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independently by the investigations that preceded those
proceedings, their only available claim was malicious
prosecution, which would have been barred by section
821.6.201 Thus, all of those complaints should have been
dismissed, and the dismissals affirmed, without resort to a
general immunity for investigative conduct.
If the Court of Appeal had taken that approach, it would
have been analytically equipped to avoid the intuitively
unjust results that it reached in later cases. In Amylou R.,
for example, the plaintiffs alleged damages did not arise from
the institution or prosecution of any judicial or other
proceedings against her (there were none)20 2 but rather from
the patently defamatory statements that police officers had
publicized in the course of their investigation-the police had
told Amylou's friends and neighbors that she was an
accomplice in the abduction, rape, and murder of a friend of
hers.2 °3 Amylou was never prosecuted, she never sued anyone
for malicious prosecution, and, indeed, she could not have
done so, because no proceeding against her was ever initiated.
Accordingly, section 821.6 should have had nothing to do with
the case. Instead, the applicable immunity should have been
the general qualified immunity for law enforcement activity,
which protects public employees from liability for any "act or
omission, exercising due care, in the execution or enforcement
of any law."2 °4 It is impossible to determine from the court's
201. See Ronald S. v. County of San Diego, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 418, 419-20,
425-26 (Ct. App. 1993); Alicia T. v. County of Los Angeles, 271 Cal. Rptr. 513,
514-15 (Ct. App. 1990); Jenkins v. County of Orange, 260 Cal. Rptr. 645, 646-
47 (Ct. App. 1989). Because those cases applied a blanket immunity for
investigative conduct rather than using the analytical framework proposed in
this article, the cases' discussion does not always make clear whether the
plaintiffs' alleged damages flowed solely from the institution or prosecution of
formal proceedings.
202. Amylou R. v. County of Riverside, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 319, 320-21, 322 (Ct.
App. 1994). The court's statement of facts did not positively state that Amylou
was not prosecuted, but it did not mention any prosecution brought against her.
See id. Moreover, the court expended considerable effort in reaching the
conclusion that immunity under section 821.6 is not "limited to claims for
injuries suffered by the target of the judicial or administrative proceeding," but
rather extends to "injuries suffered by others, such as witnesses or victims." Id.
at 322. If Amylou had been prosecuted, she would have been a target of a
judicial proceeding, so that entire portion of the court's analysis would have
been superfluous. (In any event, it was arguably superfluous for other reasons.
See supra note 139.)
203. Amylou R., 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 322.
204. CAL. GOVr CODE § 820.4 (Deering 1982 & Supp. 2008).
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discussion whether the police acted reasonably when they
made their damaging statements about Amylou. If they did
not, she should have been allowed to hold them liable.
Gillan is substantively identical-there the authorities
actually sought the aid of the news media in spreading
defamatory claims about the plaintiff, who was never
prosecuted.25 And similar analysis applies to Baughman, in
which police executing a search warrant destroyed computer
disks that were the only copies of the plaintiff software
designer's work, which was the product of years of research.2 6
In all of these cases, if the police were not exercising due care,
they should have been held liable.20 7
It is probably significant that several of the early cases
developing the immunity for investigative conduct dealt with
child abuse, juvenile dependency, and state-administered
adoption proceedings.2 8 In those cases, the court may well
have been motivated by a concern to ensure that state
employees charged with protecting the interests of children
would be free to investigate and prosecute such matters
zealously, uninhibited by the fear that their decisions would
later be second-guessed by a jury in a tort suit.
To the extent that such considerations lay behind the
court's decisions to immunize the defendants in those cases,
one can certainly sympathize. But the misguided means that
the court adopted-application of an absolute immunity to all
investigative conduct-has the perverse consequence of
barring liability even for conduct that would constitute child
abuse, as long as it is done by a public employee. If a state-
employed social worker investigating a child abuse complaint
were to molest the victim after first asking, "Is this what
205. Gillan v. City of San Marino, 55 Cal. Rptr. 3d 158, 164-65 (Ct. App.
2007).
206. Baughman v. California, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 82, 85 (Ct. App. 1995).
207. See, e.g., Ogborn v. City of Lancaster, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 238, 241-43,
248-49 (Ct. App. 2002) (holding that section 821.6 did not bar a claim for
conversion when public officials destroyed certain property in the course of
executing a nuisance abatement order, because the property was not the subject
of the order and the destruction occurred after the official proceedings had
concluded); Tallmadge v. County of Los Angeles, 236 Cal. Rptr. 338, 339-41 (Ct.
App. 1987) (reaching a similar conclusion).
208. See Ronald S. v. County of San Diego, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 418 (Ct. App.
1993) (state-administered adoption); Alicia T. v. County of Los Angeles, 271 Cal.
Rptr. 513 (Ct. App. 1990) (child abuse and dependency proceedings); Jenkins v.
County of Orange, 260 Cal. Rptr. 645 (Ct. App. 1989) (child abuse).
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daddy did to you?", all claims by the victim against the social
worker would be barred under the Court of Appeal's
interpretation of section 821.6. Thus, here again the
judgment of the California legislature seems to have been
more sensible than that of the Court of Appeal: of course child
abuse investigators, like law enforcement personnel
generally, should vigorously pursue their occupations, but
they must exercise reasonable care when they do so or else
face liability for any harm they cause.
Cappuccio and Ingram likewise are based on expansive
interpretations of section 821.6 that are insupportable in view
of Sullivan. In Cappuccio, a law enforcement officer grossly
misrepresented the magnitude of the crime of which the
plaintiff was convicted. 20 9  Because the prosecution was
successful, however, the plaintiff did not and could not sue for
malicious prosecution. Rather, the plaintiff sought to hold
the officer liable for the officer's concededly false
postprosecution statements, not for the prosecution itself. If
there is an immunity that protects prosecuting authorities
from liability for defamatory misrepresentations-even
deliberate misrepresentations-concerning the prosecutions
they win, the immunity must have some basis other than
section 821.6. And in Ingram, the plaintiff school board
member was never prosecuted, so her claims had nothing to
do with malicious prosecution or section 821.6, just like the
claims in Amylou R.210 Also, as in Amylou R., the plaintiffs
claims in Ingram were based on harm that was caused by law
enforcement authorities' public statements, not by the
initiation or prosecution of a judicial or other proceeding,
because no such proceeding existed.211  Again, if the
authorities failed to exercise due care when they made the
statements at issue, then they should have been liable.212
209. Cappuccio, Inc. v. Harmon, 257 Cal. Rptr. 4, 5 (Ct. App. 1989).
210. Ingram v. Flippo, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 60, 62-64 (Ct. App. 1999).
211. Id.
212. One other possibility in the cases involving public statements (e.g.,
Cappuccio, Ingram, and Gillan) is that some of the statements might have been
protected by the litigation privilege. See supra Part I.B; see also supra note 57
and accompanying text. A complete analysis of this issue would be beyond the
scope of this article. It should be noted, however, that extension of the litigation
privilege to cover some of the statements at issue in those cases would probably
be much more benign than the Court of Appeal's extension of section 821.6 to
cover all investigative conduct. The litigation privilege applies only to
statements, but an absolute privilege for investigative conduct applies even to
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One of the most striking features of the Court of Appeal's
analysis in these cases is the court's seemingly total lack of
awareness of the breadth and severity of the doctrine it was
creating. For example, if the police had shot Baughman dead,
maliciously and without probable cause (perhaps because one
of the officers was a friend of a competing software designer),
and even though Baughman was neither named in the
warrant nor in any sense a target of the search, it would not
have made any difference. According to the court,
investigation is absolutely "cloaked with immunity,"213 so
Baughman's survivors could not have sued for wrongful death
or any other tort. To take another example, if an accused
child molester pled guilty to simple assault in exchange for
dismissal of all other charges, but the prosecutor later
announced to the press, maliciously and without probable
cause, that the accused had pled guilty to child molestation,
section 821.6 would again provide an absolute bar to liability.
Under Cappuccio, such malicious misreporting of successful
prosecutions is "part of the prosecution process" and hence
absolutely immune.214
As these hypotheticals suggest, the Court of Appeal's
construction and application of section 821.6 not only are
irreconcilable with the statutory text, legislative history, and
binding Supreme Court precedent 215 but also are unjustifiable
as a matter of policy. The purpose of section 821.6, as
articulated by both the Supreme Court and the principal
architect of the California Tort Claims Act, is to protect
exercises of prosecutorial discretion.2 6  By absolutely
prohibiting actions for malicious prosecution, the statute
shields the decision to prosecute from after-the-fact scrutiny
for evidence of malice or lack of probable cause. As a matter
of policy, then, the statute should have nothing to do with
cases involving harm that is caused independently of any
decision to prosecute, or cases in which the authorities decline
to prosecute at all. Indeed, section 820.4, which generally
immunizes law enforcement conduct only if it is undertaken
with due care, reflects the California legislature's policy
the infliction of bodily injuries or destruction of property.
213. Baughman v. California, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 82, 89 (Ct. App. 1995).
214. Cappuccio, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 6.
215. See generally supra Part I.A.
216. See supra Part I.A.
2009] 425
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
judgment that law enforcement authorities do not need the
protection of absolute immunity in order to do their jobs
effectively.
To summarize: The Court of Appeal opinions that
developed the broad interpretation of section 821.6 did not
reach uniformly wrong results, as the foregoing discussion
shows. In some cases (such as Kemmerer) the court came to
the right conclusion but for the wrong reasons. Those wrong
reasons, however, later led the court to reach patently unjust
conclusions in other cases (such as Amylou R. and
Baughman). Regrettably, the court never noticed that
something had gone dreadfully wrong, and that there was a
relatively straightforward way out of the thicket it had
created.217
CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeal's construction and application of
section 821.6 have created a regime of lawless law
enforcement in California. The court has handed the state's
law enforcement authorities a license to kill or to do any other
damage that strikes their fancy, even maliciously and without
probable cause, as long as they do it in the course of
investigating crime.
California officials can, of course, still be sued under
federal law.21 The existence of possible federal remedies,
however, should not divest the California government of its
interest in protecting its citizens against the wanton infliction
of harm by state government employees. But the Court of
Appeal has effectively held that the California government
has no such interest-according to the court, California's law
enforcement authorities are absolutely above the law.
The Court of Appeal's doctrine is lawless in another sense
as well, because the court's own decisions have been in direct
217. It is worth noting that some of the Court of Appeal's published opinions
involving section 821.6 do not merely reach the right results for the wrong
reasons, see supra notes 199-201 and accompanying text, but actually reach the
right results for largely the right reasons, mirroring in some respects the
analysis proposed in this article, see supra notes 196-97, 207. Unfortunately,
the relative handful of cases that employ a sound analytical framework never
criticize, or even take note of, the unsound reasoning that prevails in the bulk of
the case law. The well-reasoned cases have consequently done nothing to retard
the development of the expansive interpretation of section 821.6.
218. See 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2008).
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defiance of California Supreme Court precedent, which all
lower California courts are legally required to follow. 219 The
Court of Appeal's expansive construction of section 821.6
turns out, when traced back to its origins, to be based on
nothing. Spohn, which was the first post-Sullivan case to
hold that section 821.6 is not limited to malicious prosecution,
did not even cite Sullivan and instead relied on a single case
that had nothing to do with section 821.6. Kayfetz followed
up by stating that Spohn "demonstrates" that "section 821.6
is not limited to suits for damages for malicious
prosecution ,' 220 and that was that. By 1984, the Court of
Appeal had, in effect, overruled Sullivan by ignoring it.
The lawlessness of the Court of Appeal's decisions has
put California's trial courts in an unenviable position. On the
one hand, there is abundant Court of Appeal case law telling
the trial courts that section 821.6 is not limited to malicious
prosecution. On the other hand, the Supreme Court's
decision in Sullivan tells them that section 821.6 is indeed so
limited. But there is also a wealth of Court of Appeal case
law telling them that Sullivan does not mean what it says.
Under these circumstances, even trial courts that realize the
Court of Appeal's construction of section 821.6 is baseless
cannot do anything about it-they are bound by the Court of
Appeal's decisions, which hold that Sullivan did not limit
section 821.6 to malicious prosecution after all.
In White v. Towers,22' one of the first cases to recognize
the common law immunity on which section 821.6 was based,
the majority and the dissent vigorously disagreed about the
consequences of immunizing police against suits for malicious
prosecution. The majority rejected the plaintiffs argument
that the immunity "constitute[d] a step toward the creation of
a 'police state.' "222 The dissent saw things differently,
agreeing with the plaintiff that the immunity was "a major
step toward statism."223
That case was decided over fifty years ago. Today, after
decades of relentless prodding by the Court of Appeal,
Californians find themselves at the bottom of the slippery
219. Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court, 369 P.2d 937, 940 (Cal. 1962).
220. Kayfetz v. State of California, 203 Cal. Rptr. 33, 36 (Ct. App. 1984).
221. White v. Towers, 235 P.2d 209 (Cal. 1951).
222. Id. at 213.
223. Id. at 216.
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slope that the White dissent astutely perceived. As soon as an
appropriate case presents itself, the California Supreme
Court should take the opportunity to pull the people of
California back up that slope and subject California law
enforcement officials to California law once again.
